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Abstract 
 
 
 
Purpose 
This paper aims to investigate the effect of environmental, social, and governance disclosure 
(ESGD) on firm performance (FP) before and after the introduction of integrated reporting (IR) 
further to exploring a potential moderation effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms 
on this relationship.  
Design/methodology/approach  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) and firm-fixed effects models were estimated based on data 
related to FTSE 350 between 2009 and 2018. The data has been mainly collected from 
Bloomberg and Capital IQ. This analysis was supplemented with applying a two-stage least 
squares (2 SLS) model to address any concerns regarding the expected occurrence of 
endogeneity problems. 
Findings 
The results show a positive and significant relationship between ESGD score and firm 
performance before and after 2013, among a sample of FTSE 350. Furthermore, the study is 
suggestive of a moderation effect of CG mechanisms (i.e., ownership concentration, gender 
diversity and board size)  on the ESGD-FP nexus. Additionally, this paper finds that firms 
voluntarily associated with IR have a tendency to achieve better firm financial performance. 
Practical implications 
The findings of the present study have several policy and practitioner implications. For 
example, managers may engage in ESGD to enhance their firms’ financial performance by the 
voluntary involvement in IR, which believed to help investors to rationalise their investment 
decisions. Likewise, the results reiterate the crucial need to integrate more social, 
environmental and economic regulations to promote sustainability in the UK. The paper also 
offers a systematic picture for policymakers in the UK as well as future researchers. 
Social implications 
The findings of this paper indicate that IR plays a significant role in the relationship between 
ESGD and FP, where IR firms seemed to be achieving better FP as compared with their non-
IR counterparts. This implies that stakeholders may have played a magnificent effort to 
encourage firms’ voluntary engagement in IR in the UK. 
Originality/value 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to explore the potential moderating 
effect of ownership concentration, gender diversity and board size on the relationship between 
ESGD and FP and to examine whether firms’ voluntary involvement in IR can lead to better 
FP after the introduction of IR in 2013 in the UK. 
 
Keywords: Environmental disclosure; social disclosure; governance disclosure; integrated 
reporting; ownership concentration; gender diversity; board size. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
As sustainability  is increasingly significant to economic development, corporate 
environmental and social responsibility has become an international trend, and this was 
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accompanied with a lack of firms’ non-financial disclosure such as environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) information and practice (Li et al., 2018). Recently, there is a growing 
demand for improving business reporting,  with more focus on encouraging firms to provide 
more non-financial information (Lai et al., 2018). Sustainable development is not only related 
to CSR and accounting standards but also associated with customer satisfaction (Akisik and 
Gal, 2011). Previous research focuses on the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on 
firm value or the concept of socially responsible investing (SRI) and lacks the perspective of 
sustainability and integrated reporting (Kimbro and Cao, 2011; Li et al., 2019). 
Environmental, social, and governance disclosures (ESGD) offer a more significant 
opportunity to understand firms’ non-financial reporting. Non-financial information can help 
corporate managers in the fulfilment of their strategic environmental objectives (Alewine and 
Stone, 2013). Furthermore, corporate ESGD appeared to be of imperative importance to both 
academics and practitioners. In addition to this, stakeholders began to raise questions about 
managers’ credentials in integrating environmental, social and governance considerations 
(Husted and Sousa-Filho, 2018). According to the arguments of stakeholder and agency 
theories, firms have to adopt a more sustainable and long-term value view as stakeholders are 
concerned about a company's ESG factors to know where the firm invests and how the firm 
conducts business (Eccles et al., 2014; Atan et al., 2018). For instance, the environmental 
concerns of stakeholders might be related to natural environment protection, climate change, 
and environmental impacts arising from a business operation. 
Moreover, social factors, which are important to stakeholders could be human rights, 
equality, diversity in the workplace, and contribution to society. Further, concerns related to 
governance issues are ownership structure, board independence, minority shareholders’ rights, 
transparency, and disclosure quality. Investors may have a preference for products that consider 
and reflect the relationship between their investments and ESG challenging (Li et al., 2018). 
Further to this, by 2030, all firms are expected to disclose information related to their 
environmental and social effect according to the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Stock 
Exchange (SSE) initiative (SSE, 2015). 
ESG is a commonly researched concept, which has been considered as an important 
part of the strategy of the firm because it might have a crucial effect on firm performance 
(Aouadi and Marsat, 2018; Fatemi et al., 2017; Baldini et al., 2016; El Ghoul et al., 2017; 
Nekhili et al., 2017; Aboud and Diab, 2018).  ESG integration has become an essential issue 
for investors, governments, regulators, firms, non‐governmental organisations (Lee et al., 
2013). Understanding what motivates integrated reporting, therefore, is crucial following 
stakeholders demand. However, understanding what motivates sustainability reporting could 
be developed by the concept of reputation risk management (Hogan and Lodhia, 2011). 
Various studies examine the relationship between ESG and FP; the findings are inconclusive 
(Cho et al., 2006; Garay and Font, 2012; Madsen and Rodgers, 2015; Revelli and Viviani, 
2015; Bernardi and Stark, 2018; Li et al., 2018). 
Integrated reporting (IR) concept has attracted the attention of academics and 
practitioners since it had been introduced in 2013 (Velte and Stawinoga, 2016); however, there 
is an on-going discussion on the benefits and the ability to meet the needs of stakeholders. 
According to value-creating theory, it is predicted that the integration of environmental and 
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social responsibility into corporate strategies and practices reduces firm risk and promotes 
long-term value creation (Yu and Zhao, 2015). Since IR is voluntary in the UK, companies are 
motivated by the fact that stakeholders have demanded extensive disclosure on ESG issues. 
Thus, firms in the UK have enough incentive to voluntarily engage in integrating ESG 
information into corporate reports to meet the demands of stakeholders.  
In addition to this, governance mechanisms would play a crucial role in the relationship 
between ESGD and FP; thus this paper investigates the role of three governance mechanisms 
in the ESG-FP nexus namely ownership concentration, gender diversity and board size. 
Concentrated ownership could lead to specific ESGD because of the efforts from the principal 
owners, and it can also affect decisions on firms’ policies related to ESGD (Dam and Scholtens, 
2013; Akben-Selcuk, 2019). Further, research on board gender diversity, ESGD and FP are 
very rare; however, board size and more women on the board can improve the processes of 
decision-making, including decisions and strategies about ESGD by providing different 
approaches in board discussions; thus more women on the board of directors would help to 
generate new ideas and to have different opinions related to the decision making process, this 
might ultimately result in a positive impact on financial performance (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Allegrini and Greco, 2011; Giannarakis et al., 2014; and Husted and Sousa-Filho, 2018). 
Previous research focuses on the effect of social responsibility disclosure or ESGD on 
FP, although it lacks the perspective of IR and other governance attributes which would 
substantially affect this relationship. Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate on the effect of 
ESGD on FP. Therefore, this paper aims to study the effect of ESGD on FP before and after 
the introduction of IR in the UK.  In addition, it attempts to explore the underlying drivers of 
this relationship between ESGD and FP by investigating three potential moderators, namely, 
ownership concentration, gender diversity and board size. This study also seeks to examine 
whether IR acts as a moderator on the association between ESGD and FP after 2013. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that compares the effect of ESGD on FP before 
and after the introduction of IR as well as explores potential moderators on this relationship. 
This study contributes to the dearth of extant literature in three ways. First, unlike previous 
studies, the current research considers the potential impact of IR introduction in 2013 on the 
ESGD-FP nexus. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the 
potential moderating roles of ownership concentration, gender diversity and board size on the 
relationship between ESGD and FP. Third, by focusing on the period after the introduction of 
IR in 2013, this paper exclusively investigates the voluntary adoption of IR and whether it has 
played a positive effect on the relationship between ESGD and FP. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the research 
hypotheses based on analysing the literature of the relationship between ESG, firm 
performance, IR and three governance mechanisms. Section 3 presents the sample and 
variables measurement for empirical research. Section 4 provides a discussion on the empirical 
results; then section 5 provides some additional analysis and section 6 summarises the main 
conclusions and puts forward policy recommendations.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 ESG and firm performance 
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Many research studies have examined the effect of ESGD on firm performance,  although 
their results were inconsistent. Some researchers (e.g., Qiu et al. 2016) couldn’t find any 
relationship, whereas others confirmed that ESGD could lead to increasing a firm’s cost, 
making it an economic disadvantage (Yoon et al., 2018). From a value-enhancing theory 
perspective, prior studies indicate that ESGD may positively influence firms performance in 
both direct and indirect ways; thus this enhance companies’ competitive advantages as well as 
shareholder value (Bernardi and Stark, 2018; Li et al., 2018). Certainly, the benefits of 
corporate engagement in ESGD seemed to be including inter alia operating efficiency 
enhancement and improving firm reputation in the capital market (Yoon et al., 2018; Li et al., 
2018). A positive relationship between ESGD and FP can be supported by stakeholder theory. 
Tantalo and Priem (2016) believe that each essential stakeholder group (e.g., investors, debtors, 
employees, customers, and regulators) considers ESGD as a potential source of value creation. 
The essential tool for improving FP is managing the core business stakeholders relationships. 
From a stakeholder theory perspective, firms may enhance their financial performance through 
indirect benefits by engaging in good relationships with stakeholders (Hamman et al., 2010). 
Firms with socially and environmentally responsible behaviour along with good governance 
practice would satisfy the interests of stakeholders and thus improve FP (Aboud and Diab, 
2018). 
Furthermore, the resource-based theory argues that firms with superior ESGD can gain 
competitive advantages (Branco et al., 2006; Li et al., 2019). Moreover, resource-based theory 
is suggestive of a positive relationship between ESGD and FP. This means that investing in 
ESGD may help firms to develop new internal resources as well as generate external benefits 
through corporate reputation (Branco et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the majority of the extant studies have used stakeholder theory to explain 
the positive relationship between ESGD and FP (Yoon et al., 2018; Aboud and Diab, 2018; 
Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018). This paper, however, combines the concepts of both 
stakeholders and resource-based theories to gain the richest possible understanding of the 
nature of the ESGD-FP nexus. -This paper, therefore, argues that firms with superior ESGD 
may gain a competitive advantage, better reputation and higher firm performance. Thus, the 
first hypothesis to test is: 
H1: ESG disclosure positively related to firm performance. 
 
2.2 Ownership concentration, ESG disclosure and firm performance 
 
Recently, the impact of ownership concentration on the relationship between ESGD 
and firm performance has become of great interest to shareholders, practitioners, and 
governance regulators (Peng and Yang, 2014). ESGD might attract large shareholders, and this 
may result in an extensive investment, as well as concentrated ownership could lead to specific 
ESGD due to stakeholders’ efforts (Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Akben-Selcuk, 2019). Further, 
the relationship between ESGD and FP  can be influenced by firms’ ownership concentration 
(Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Kao et al., 2018; Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018; Akben-Selcuk, 
2019). Thus, it is important to consider the role of ownership concentration in the relationship 
between ESGD and FP because it can affect decisions on firm policies related to ESGD. Large 
shareholders might have incentives to disclosure more ESG information as well as to use their 
controlling position to get private benefits and gains at the cost of other minority shareholders’ 
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wealth, which causes agency problems (Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Kao et al., 2018). According 
to stakeholder theory, large shareholders may have a preference to involve more in ESGD not 
only for their private interest but also to develop good relationships with stakeholders, which 
helps in enhancing their reputation and thus improve firm performance (Dam and Scholtens, 
2013; Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018). Therefore, the second hypothesis to test in this paper is 
as follows: 
  
H2: Ownership concentration moderates the relationship between ESG and firm performance. 
 
2.3 Gender diversity, ESGD and firm performance 
 
Recently, board gender diversity has increasingly received more attention in terms of 
its relation to corporate governance and CSR disclosure (Ullah et al., 2019). Women on the 
boards of UK firms positively contribute to firm value and reaffirm government emphasis on 
the need for more women on corporate boards to bring about gender equity (Agyemang-Mintah 
and Schadewitz, 2019). Previous studies suggest that board gender diversity has a positive 
effect on ESGD and CSR disclosure (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Javaid Lone et al., 2016; 
Galbreath, 2013; Orazalin, 2019; Gulzar et al., 2019). In this regard, stakeholder theory 
suggests that board gender diversity may have a positive effect on ESGD. Resource 
dependence theory, furthermore, suggests that gender diversity improves decision-making and 
helps align the organisation with its external environment and resources; thereby enhancing the 
firm’s financial performance (Agyemang-Mintah and Schadewitz, 2019). However, Manita et 
al. (2018) and Alazzani et al. (2018) found no significant relationship between board gender 
diversity and ESGD.  Agency theory tends to support the notion that firms associated with 
diverse gender in the board have a more increased ability to effectively monitor management 
behaviour, which will eventually enhance firm performance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  In 
general, women on the board can provide different angles in board discussions, which would 
improve the processes of decision-making, including decisions and strategies about ESGD, so 
more women (diversity) on the board of directors help to increase the different opinions and 
the quality of the discussion related to the decision-making process, which is believed to 
increase the quality of those decisions and this would potentially have a positive impact on 
financial performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Giannarakis et al., 2014; and Husted and 
Sousa-Filho, 2018). However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to consider 
the moderating role of women on the board on the relationship between ESGD and FP among 
FTSE 350. Therefore, this paper proposes: 
 
H3: Board gender diversity moderates the relationship between ESG and firm performance. 
 
2.4 Board size, ESGD and firm performance 
 
Many researchers believe that more directors on the boards would likely help in 
bringing more different views in the processes of decision-making. Agency theory proposes 
that the board of directors acts as representative of the various groups of shareholders for 
monitoring the performance and controlling the activities of managers. A larger board consists 
of more directors who serve the interests of shareholders in monitoring and controlling firms’ 
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behaviour and leading, thereby, to increase firm performance. Thus, agency theory suggests 
that a large-sized board enhances firm performance by offering a better monitoring process. A 
larger number of directors have to discuss and negotiate more effectively to reach an 
agreement, which means that they are less likely to make decisions that differ significantly; 
thus decrease or prevent the variability of firm performance and might lead to better 
performance. The empirical evidence on the relationship between board size, ESGD and FP is 
mixed (Kao et al., 2018; Husted and Sousa-Filho, 2018; Orazalin, 2019). Some previous 
research found a positive and significant effect of board size on ESGD (Allegrini and Greco, 
2011; Javaid Lone et al., 2016 and Husted and Sousa-Filho, 2018). However, others (e.g., 
Giannarakis et al., 2014;  Orazalin, 2019) could not find any significant impact of board size 
on ESGD and CSR disclosure. Thus, we argue that a larger board will bring better perspectives 
in decision making; thus firms with the large-sized boards are likely to disclose more ESG 
information, which might, to an extent, lead to better firm performance. Thus, this paper 
proposes: 
 
H4: Board size moderates the relationship between ESG and firm performance. 
 
2.5 ESG and integrated reporting 
 
Although integrated reporting (IR) concept is gaining remarkable attention; empirical 
research on this concept is scarce (Robertson and Samy, 2015; Lai et al., 2018; Maniora, 2017). 
Stakeholders mainly investors have demanded extensive disclosure on ESG related issues; 
thus, firms in the UK have enough incentive to engage in ESGD and IR to meet stakeholders 
demands voluntarily. Firms are likely to benefit from “integrated thinking” as a possible result 
of IR; hence firms can have a better understanding of the link between their value drivers and 
strategic goals (Simnett and Huggins, 2015).  Consequently, linking ESGD with financial 
reporting through an integrated report provides stakeholders with an improved understanding 
of the firm and its future (Bernardi and Stark, 2018). The integrated reports of firms, which do 
not disclose much on ESG are unlikely to enhance the understanding of the linkages between 
ESGD and financial performance (Bernardi and Stark, 2018). 
Further to this, there is a potential link between ESGD, and firm performance (Yoon et 
al., 2018; Aboud and Diab, 2018; Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018) and IR might help to make it 
more visible. However, this paper assumes that IR introduction in 2013 significantly affects 
ESGD, which will somehow affect FP. Thus, we proposed that firms voluntarily involved in 
IR would have higher ESGD and FP. 
 
H5: IR moderates the relationship between ESG and firm performance. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample and data collection 
The initial sample of this paper includes all firms that made up the FTSE 350 over the 
period 2009-2018 except 2013 the year in which IR has been introduced. We exclude firm-
years that miss the necessary data for the variables used in our analysis. The final sample 
consists of 1943 firm-year observations. Furthermore, the data of this paper is collected from 
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two data sources, which are Bloomberg, S&P Capital IQ. Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores 
have been commonly used in the academic literature (Nollet et al., 2016, Manita et al., 2018). 
3.2. Research models and variables measurement 
       This paper uses five regression models to test the hypotheses as follows: 
  Tobins Q= 0 + 1 ESGDS + 2 Hold+ 3 Women% + 4 BSize + 5 Lev + 6 LogFS + 
Year/Industry Fixed Effects+        (1) 
Tobins Q = 0 + 1 ESGDS + 2 Hold + 3ESGDS*Hold+ 4 Lev + 5 LogFS + 
Year/Industry Fixed Effects+           (2) 
Tobins Q = 0 + 1 ESGDS + 2 Women% + 3ESGDS*Women% + 4 Lev + 5 LogFS + 
Year/Industry Fixed Effects+            (3) 
Tobins Q = 0 + 1 ESGDS + 2 Bsize + 3ESGDS*Bsize+ 4 Lev + 5 LogFS + 
Year/Industry Fixed Effects+           (4) 
Tobins Q= 0 + 1 ESGDS + 2 Hold+ 3 Women% + 4 BSize + 5 IR + 6ESGDS*IR+ 
7 Lev + 8 LogFS + Year/Industry Fixed Effects+        (5)    
 
Firm performance: much recent research (El Ghoul et al., 2017; Aboud and Diab, 2018; 
Li et al., 2018) have confirmed that Tobin's Q is a valid measurement of firm performance. 
Tobin's Q not only reflects past performance but also represents the firm's future development 
expectations (Li et al., 2019). Thus, this paper selects Tobin's Q to measure firm performance. 
ESG Disclosure: ESG Disclosure score provided by Bloomberg is based on the available 
information in the annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports, and firms’ websites. 
Further, this score ranges from 0.1 for firms that disclose a minimum amount of ESG data to 
100 for those that disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg. Recently, ESG disclosure 
scores provided by Bloomberg have been widely used in the academic literature (Nollet et al., 
2016 and Manita et al., 2018). Ownership concentration: This paper uses the sum of holdings 
of the three largest shareholders as a percentage as a measurement for Ownership concentration 
in line with prior ESG-to-FP studies (e.g., Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Kao et al., 2018; Brooks 
and Oikonomou 2018; Akben-Selcuk, 2019).  Gender diversity: The percentage of women on 
board of directors has been used as a measurement for gender diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Giannarakis et al., 2014; and Husted and Sousa-Filho, 2018).  Board Size: The number 
of directors on the firm's board is used to measure board size (Allegrini and Greco, 2011; Javaid 
Lone et al., 2016 and Husted and Sousa-Filho, 2018; Orazalin, 2019). Control variables: firm 
size and leverage are used as control variables (Bernardi and Stark, 2018; Aouadi and Marsat, 
2018; Kao et al., 2018; Aboud and Diab, 2018).  
4. Empirical results 
 
Table I provides the descriptive statistics of the included variables for pre and post-
2013 periods. The mean of ESG disclosure score for the pre-2013 sample is 36.304% which 
reflects that many firms don’t provide high-level of ESG information according to Bloomberg 
measurement. In addition to this, the results clearly show that there is no company entirely 
obtained an overall score of more than 70% according to Bloomberg ESG scores. The mean of 
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the environmental disclosure score is the lowest, with only 25.929%. The descriptive statistics 
for the period after 2013 are similar to the period before 2013 as it can be seen from Table II; 
however, the mean of each disclosure score has increased.  
 
INSERT TABLES I/ II HERE. 
 
The correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables are presented in 
Tables III and IV. The correlation matrix shows the correlation between firm performance and 
its explanatory variables, as well as the correlations among other variables. This will help to 
check the statistical relationship between the dependent and the independent variables, and 
whether there is any potential sign of Collinearity. It can be decided that Multicollinearity does 
not appear to be a concern in explaining the regression results from VIF results which tested 
separately. Furthermore, we test the difference between ESGDS before and after the 
introduction of IR separately as we noted that ESGDS have increasing trends over time 
according to Bloomberg measurement so we use two-sample t-tests for the mean difference 
between the Pre-2013 period and Post-2013 period and the difference is insignificant1.  
 
INSERT TABLE III HERE. 
 
INSERT TABLE IV HERE. 
 
Table V shows the regression results for the first model, Model (1) used to test the first 
hypothesis, which says that ESGDS is positively related to firm performance. The findings of 
the study discovered that ESDS enhances firm performance before and after the introduction 
of IR, which can also be explained by stakeholder theory consistent with the results of previous 
studies (Yoon et al., 2018; Aboud and Diab, 2018; Brooks and Oikonomou, 2018). Following 
this, as it can be seen from Table VI, we divided our sample into three sub-samples, First, firms 
with a low level of ESGDS (less than 30%) according to the Bloomberg measurement. Second, 
firms with a medium level of ESGDS (30% or 40%). Third, firms with a high level of ESGDS 
(more than 40%). The coefficients of low ESGDS, Medium ESDS and High ESGDS are 
positive; however, the coefficient of the high ESGDS firms is 0.266, which is larger than the 
coefficients of the low ESGDS, and the medium ESGDS samples. This means that firms with 
high ESGDS have the highest firm performance. Further, the coefficients of these variables 
after the introduction of IR are higher than the coefficients before 2013. 
 
INSERT TABLES V/ VI HERE. 
 
Moreover, the results from Table VII  indicate that the coefficient of the interaction 
between ownership concentration and ESGDS is significant at 5%; so this confirms that 
ownership concentration moderates the relationship between ESDS and firm performance. This 
implies that concentrated ownership might lead to a higher ESG disclosure due to the efforts 
of the major owners (Dam and Scholtens, 2013; Kao et al., 2018; Brooks and Oikonomou 2018; 
Akben-Selcuk, 2019). Furthermore, the results when running Model 3 show that gender 
 
1 We don’t report VIF and two-sample test in this section for simplicity. 
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diversity moderates the effect of ESDS on firm performance (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Javaid 
Lone et al., 2016; Galbreath, 2013; Orazalin, 2019; Gulzar et al., 2019; Agyemang-Mintah and 
Schadewitz, 2019). Moreover, women on boards enhance board monitoring and bring a 
diversity of ideas, new perspectives, experience and business knowledge to the decision-
making process in boardrooms, thereby improving the firm’s financial valuation (Agyemang-
Mintah and Schadewitz, 2019). Thus, firms are encouraged to have more women on the board. 
Firms with higher ESG disclosure along with robust governance mechanisms would satisfy the 
interests of stakeholders and improve firm performance. In addition to this, board size acts as 
a moderator on the relationship between ESGDS and firm performance pre- and post-2013 as 
it can be seen from running Model 4. 
Further, as it can be seen from Model 5, we run the regression only for the period after 
2013 by taking into account IR as a dummy variable equals one if a firm w involved in 
preparing IR and the report is available for stakeholders and 0 otherwise to test whether firms 
with IR have higher firm performance as well as to explore whether IR moderates the 
relationship between ESGDS and firm performance. The results show that IR firms have higher 
firm performance comparing to those without IR. However, the interaction between IR and 
ESGDS is positively and significantly attributed to firm performance, which confirms that IR 
moderates the relationship between ESGDS and firm performance. 
 
INSERT TABLE VII HERE. 
 
 
5. Additional analysis 
Using the main components of the ESG score (i.e.,  environmental disclosure, social disclosure 
and governance disclosure) separately in the regression analysis, this paper finds that the 
associations between environmental, social and governance disclosures and firm performance 
were consistent with the main results, but, the interaction between governance disclosure and 
both ownership concentration and board size were statistically insignificant. 
Following this, we used ROA and ROE as alternative measurements for firm performance. The 
results are in line with the main result for both ROE and ROA except we couldn't find a piece 
of evidence regarding the moderating effect of ownership concentration when using ROA as a 
dependent variable in all models. Additionally, to address any concerns regarding the potential 
occurrence of simultaneity and endogeneity issues, we conduct 2SLS regressions using 
market/book and lagged values, and the findings are consistent with our main results, 
suggesting that endogeneity does not drive our main findings. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the impact of ESGD on FP before and after the introduction of 
integrated reporting in 2013  further to exploring the potential moderating effect of ownership 
concentration, gender diversity and board size on this relationship among a  sample of FTSE 
350 over the period 2009-2018. The results show that ESGD  is attributed to firm performance. 
This paper, furthermore, finds that ownership concentration, gender diversity and board size 
moderate the ESGD-FP nexus. This implies that the primary shareholders of FTSE 350 firms 
consider ESGD as a strategy of improving firms’ image and reputation with the expectation of 
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value creation in the long-term. Likewise, women on boards may have exercised more effort 
to push managers towards more engagement in ESGD. 
Moreover, we found that IR moderates the relationship between ESGD and  FP for the 
period after 2013, and the firms which have voluntarily involved in IR have a tendency to 
achieve higher firm financial performance. However, this paper couldn’t find significant 
differences in ESGD when comparing the two periods. Besides, the interaction between 
governance disclosure and both of ownership concentration and board size were insignificant 
when running the regression for each individual disclosure score of ESG separately.  
This paper contributes to the ESG-to-FP literature by considering the potential effect of 
IR introduction in 2013 further to exploring the potential moderating roles of ownership 
concentration, gender diversity and board size on such a relationship. In addition to this, this 
paper provides a shred of early evidence on the voluntary adoption of IR and its impact on the 
ESGD-FP nexus following the introduction of IR. 
The findings of this paper would be extremely relevant to the government, investors 
and firm’s managers. For instance, firms may improve ESGD along with integrating their ESG 
information within their financial reports in order to enhance their financial performance, 
which may help investors to understand and make their investment decision easily. 
Additionally, our findings recommend policymakers to develop more effective enforcement 
mechanisms for list firms to be mandatorily engaged in integrating their ESG information 
within their financial reports.  
This paper mainly focuses on the impact of ESGD on FP before and after the 
introduction of IR as well as the role of ownership concentration, gender diversity and board 
size on this association. Future researchers, therefore, can further investigate this issue by 
considering another country or using content analysis to check each IR provided by firms or 
whether ESGD from different countries would heterogeneously affect FP when taking IR issue 
into account. Further studies can also consider the industry-level firm performance while 
investigating the role of ownership concentration, gender diversity and board size. 
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Appendix 1 
Variables description 
Variables Description Reference 
Tobin's Q 
The market value of assets divided by the replacement 
value of assets. 
Aboud and Diab, 2018; El 
Ghoul et al., 2017; Li et 
al., 2018. 
ESGDS 
Zero to 100 is the range of the Bloomberg ESG disclosure 
score. 
Nollet et al., 2016, Manita 
et al., 2018; Bernardi and 
Stark, 2018. 
Hold 
The sum of holdings of the three largest shareholders as a 
percentage. 
Dam and Scholtens, 2013; 
Kao et al., 2018; Brooks 
and Oikonomou 2018; 
Akben-Selcuk, 2019. 
Women% The percentage of women on board of directors. 
Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Giannarakis et al., 
2014; and Husted and 
Sousa-Filho, 2018. 
BSize The number of directors on the firm's board. 
Aboud and Diab, 2018; 
Bernardi and Stark, 2018. 
Lev The total debt divided by total assets. 
Bernardi and Stark, 2018; 
Aouadi and Marsat, 2018; 
Kao et al., 2018; Aboud 
and Diab, 2018. 
LogFS The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Bernardi and Stark, 2018; 
Aouadi and Marsat, 2018; 
Kao et al., 2018; Aboud 
and Diab, 2018. 
IR 
A dummy variable equals 1 if the firm was involved in 
preparing IR, and the report is available for stakeholders 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Table I Descriptive Statistics pre-2013 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
 
ESGDS 
 
1032 
 
36.304 
 
11.339 
 
11.157 
 
69.421 
ENV 1032 25.929 14.617 1.55 74.419 
Soc 1032 38.324 12.992 3.509 84.21 
Gov 1032 57.352 7.31 39.286 82.143 
Hold 1017 28.315 15.49 21.152 78.11 
Women% 1032 18.068 11.048 0 57.143 
Bsize 1032 9.365 2.455 3 21 
Lev (control) 1032 6.433 33.517 1.035 240.33 
LogFS(control) 1032 3.642 2.856 1.634 6.229 
 
 
 
 
Table II Descriptive Statistics post-2013 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
TobinsQ 911 1.975 3.51 .674 80.938 
ESGDS 911 37.418 10.873 15.636 70.124 
ENV 911 28.814 14.161 7.525 73.595 
Soc 911 40.941 12.487 8.843 88.21 
Gov 911 57.515 7.102 39.943 83.143 
Hold 911 29.535 16.14 20.221 79.02 
Women% 911 19.787 11.099 0 60 
Bsize 911 9.341 2.27 5 17 
Lev (control) 911 6.188 18.923 1.005 241.153 
LogFS (control) 911 3.812 2.247 1.021 8.521 
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Table III Matrix of correlations pre-2013 sample 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1)TobinsQ 1.000       
(2) ESGDS 0.111 1.000      
(3) Hold 0.010 0.880 1.000     
(4) Women% 0.026 0.251 0.204 0.292    
(5) Bsize 0.013 0.320 0.319 0.175 0.185   
(6) Lev 0.096 0.009 0.014 -0.017 0.022 0.053  
(7) LogFS 0.232 0.220 0.219 0.275 0.285 0.162 0.220 
 
 
 
 
Table IV Matrix of correlations post-2013 sample 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  
(7) 
(1)TobinsQ 1.000       
(2) ESGDS 0.034 0.034      
(3) Hold 0.096 0.096 0.096     
(4) Women% 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079    
(5) Bsize 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014   
(6) Lev 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288  
(7) LogFS 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  
1.000 
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Table V ESG disclosure and firm performance before and after 2013 
TobinsQ    
Model 1 2009-2012 2014-2018 Pooled Sample 
ESGDS 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.023*** 
 (2.52) (3.21) (4.51) 
Hold 0.96** 0.132** 0.178** 
 (1.76) (1.91) (2.06) 
Women% 0.028*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 (3.93) (2.67) (2.96) 
Bsize 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.067*** 
 (2.221) (1.731) (1.621) 
Lev 1.817*** 0.0780*** 0.0962*** 
 (-11.65) (-3.23) (-3.74) 
LogFS 7.787*** 1.179*** 1.175*** 
 (-11.79) (-10.05) (-9.59) 
_cons 178.0*** 31.62*** 79.08*** 
 (-13.37) (-12.7) (-10.84) 
Observations 1032 911 1943 
Adjusted R^2 20.56% 23.21% 22.51% 
Industry 
dummies 
Year dummies 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Firm fixed- 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table VI ESG disclosure and firm performance before and after 2013- Sub-samples 
TobinsQ    
Sub-samples 2009-2012 2014-2018 Pooled Sample 
LowESG 0.008* 0.009* 0.007* 
 (1.13) (1.02) (0.54) 
MediumESG 0.079*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 
 (2.47) (2.82) (2.58) 
HighESG 0.174*** 0.197*** 0.166*** 
 (2.58) (2.49) (2.31) 
Hold 
 
0.96*** 0.132** 
 
0.131** 
 (2.88) (1.91) (2.41) 
Women% 0.128*** 0.024*** 0.063*** 
 (2.97) (2.41) (2.80) 
Bsize 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.067*** 
 (1.92) (1.731) (1.621) 
Lev 1.945*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 
 (-10.45) (-2.83) (-2.15) 
LogFS 2.951*** 2.512*** 3.162*** 
 (-11.79) (-10.05) (-9.529) 
_cons 177.8*** 27.62*** 63.15*** 
 (-11.57) (-13.7) (-11.02) 
Observations 1032 911 1943 
Adjusted R^2 17.86% 19.93% 20.85% 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table VII Potential moderators on ESG disclosure and firm performance (Pooled Sample) 
Tobin’s Q 2 3 4 5 
ESGDS 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.158*** 0.063*** 
 (3.40) (2.82) (4.54) (2.20) 
Hold 0.176** 
  
0.006* 
 (2.76)   (1.06) 
ESGDS*Hold 0.096   0.098 
 (0.76)   (0.63) 
  
0.371*** 
 
0.362*** 
Women%  (3.43)  (2.66) 
ESGDS* 
 
0.067*** 
 
0.081*** 
Wom%  (2.59)  (2.59) 
   
0.072*** 0.058*** 
Bsize   (4.44) (3.80) 
   0.522*** 0.012*** 
ESGDS* Bsize   (2.24) (2.65) 
Lev 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.088*** 
 (-2.98) (-2.71) (-2.88) (-3.848) 
LogFS -1.052*** -1.158*** -1.080*** -1.211*** 
 (-9.06) (-9.99) (-9.36) (-8.84) 
IR 
   
0.007* 
    (1.10) 
ESGDS*IR    0.189** 
    (1.81) 
_cons 18.7*** 15.26*** 23.78*** 21.38*** 
 (-12.6) (-13.17) (-10.13) (-11.15) 
Observations 1943 1943 1943 911 
Adjusted R^2 20.02% 21.21% 22.31% 24.55% 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
